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Abstract
According to much of the extant literature, feelings and beliefs among many citizens of being left behind and unheard by
unresponsive political decisionmakers, who lack moral integrity represent the epicenter of recent protest and populist dis‐
content in democratic society. Based on survey data for 20 contemporary democracies from two ISSP waves, we found that
anti‐establishment attitudes are not shared among the majority of respondents. Although there are differences between
country contexts. Such sentiment is associated with macrostructural dynamics, since unfavorable attitudes toward politi‐
cians are more widespread among publics in countries which are exposed to higher levels of public corruption and wit‐
nessed increasing levels of income inequality. Besides, such sentiment is also restricted to particular social groups of soci‐
ety, because hostile feelings toward political decisionmakers are stronger among citizens in the lower ranks of society and
among younger birth cohorts. Since the beginning of the century and throughout the Great Recession, unfavorable atti‐
tudes toward politicians have not increased among the public in advanced democracies. However, our analysis indicates
that respondents with such attitudes have increasingly turned toward voting for anti‐elite parties to raise their voice and
nowmake use of online options to express their political views more frequently than in the past. Overall, the analysis con‐
tributes to recent research on populist and reactionist dynamics in contemporary democracies by addressing dynamics
and structures of the feeling of being left behind by political decisionmakers and its implications for political (in)activity.
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1. Introduction
As Mair (2013, p. 19) observes: “The political class has
become a matter of contention.” Nowadays, democra‐
cies all over the world seem to be confronted with
the phenomenon of a widening gap between citizens
and their elected representatives. Discourses and world‐
views which pit “ordinary people” against “self‐serving”
and “morally corrupted” elites in a stylized friend–
foe dichotomy, have recently gained salience. Many
observers emphasize not only a withdrawal of citizens
from conventional political life, but also increasing con‐
tempt for political elites. Next to rising levels of voting
abstention, the decline of established political parties
and an overall erosion of “politics as usual,” we are wit‐
nessing two other trends: the rise of populist parties
and the rise of popular protest movements. According
to much of the literature, such parties and movements
appeal to people who are discontented with the political
mainstream, who may share the feeling of being unrep‐
resented by political authorities and disconnected from
official decisionmakers. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017,
p. 51) note: “Populist political parties use populism to
challenge the establishment and to give voice to groups
that feel unrepresented.”
While research has engaged in studying the chang‐
ing role of political parties for voters, citizens’ polit‐
ical apathy and the sympathizers of populist move‐
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ments, we know far less about how citizens’ feelings
and attitudes toward political elites look like, how they
vary socially and how they shape political behavior.
A look at the extant literature elucidates that struc‐
tures, variations, and implications of such an anti‐
establishment sentiment in contemporary democracy
needs further research.
Anti‐establishment sentiment is a phrase borrowed
from the everyday language of politics (in private talk
or media coverage) and is typically adopted in scientific
articles without any clear definition as an ad hoc seman‐
tic. Anti‐establishment sentiment as a political attitude
is conceptualized here as a component of populist atti‐
tudes. So‐called populist attitudes are commonly per‐
ceived as a multidimensional and morality‐based con‐
struct comprising (1) anti‐establishment attitudes next to
(2) a Manichean outlook on society and (3) belief in pop‐
ular sovereignty (Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde, 2004).
While anti‐establishment sentiment can generally refer
to a conglomerate of very different groups of political,
economic, intellectual, and cultural elites, we are only
interested in discontent with political elites. In the litera‐
ture on populist attitudes, anti‐establishment attitudes
are indeed typically equated with negative attitudes
toward the political establishment. Thus, whenwe speak
of anti‐establishment sentiment or anti‐establishment
attitudes, we do this with reference to political elites.
If we define attitudes as a “psychological tendency,
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some
degree or favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993,
p. 1), anti‐establishment attitudes are negative and unfa‐
vorable evaluations of political representatives. To be
more specific, anti‐establishment attitudes are a set of
“feelings of marginalization” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016) rel‐
ative to political power and beliefs of being unheard
and unrepresented by political elites who are perceived
as morally corrupt, self‐serving, and who are depriv‐
ing voters of their legitimate voice. Hence, on the one
hand, the concept comprises feelings of external polit‐
ical efficacy which refer to more generalized and affec‐
tively charged beliefs about politicians’ responsiveness
to citizens’ demands (Niemi et al., 1991). On the other
hand, it refers to beliefs that politicians lack moral
integrity (Akkerman et al., 2014). In public opinion lit‐
erature, anti‐establishment orientations have been for
long examined under the rubrics of political cynicism
(Agger et al., 1961; Rooduijn et al., 2017), political
efficacy (Niemi et al., 1991), political trust (Citrin &
Stocker, 2018) or political support (Easton, 1975). More
recently, attitudes toward the political establishment
have been included in concepts, such as political disaf‐
fection (Torcal & Montero, 2006) and populist attitudes
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert,
2020). Although “anti‐establishmentness” is not an exclu‐
sive feature of populist attitudes, the view that politi‐
cal elites are self‐serving, morally corrupt and disinter‐
ested in the “average man” is at the heart of populism
(Mudde, 2004).
Surprisingly, previous research has either explored
anti‐establishment attitudes as a component of a
broader concept, as in the cases of populist attitudes
and political cynicism, or it has been operationalized via
one single indicator, namely trust in politicians (Noordzij
et al., 2019). The analysis based on data from theGeneral
Social Survey (GSS), offered by Rahn (2019), represents a
notable exception in dealing with so‐called anti‐elite atti‐
tudes in the United States and their effect on voting for
Donald Trump. However, it should be noted that Rahn
herself did not provide any definition of her concept of
anti‐elite attitudes.
Against this backdrop, extent and social basis of
anti‐establishment sentiment still remain a lacuna—
particularly when it comes to cross‐country research.
Besides, whereas anti‐elitism and trust in politicians
have been studied as predictors of populist voting
(Rooduijn, 2018) or protest behavior (Grasso et al., 2019;
van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013), it remains
unclear whether hostility toward political elites became
over timemore important for participation in political life
or not. Therefore, this article intends to find out (1) how
widespread anti‐establishment attitudes are among the
electorate, (2) who feels left behind by political decision‐
makers, (3) how anti‐establishment attitudes are linked
tomacrostructural dynamics, and (4) whether thosewho
feel left behind by political authorities have become
politically more active than before by raising their voice
in elections, on the web or in the streets. The ana‐
lysis of hostile attitudes toward politicians is relevant
for finer‐granulated research on populist mindsets, reac‐
tionary attitudes, and convictions of (non‐)voters and
protesters. This is in particular the case, since beliefs of
being unheard by political decisionmakers can give rise
to affects like resentment and can constitute a part of
ressentiment that guides political action in populist times
(Capelos&Demertzis, 2018; Capelos&Katsanidou, 2018;
Salmela & Capelos, 2021; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017).
2. Anti‐Establishment Attitudes: Prevalence, Social
Correlates, and Political Repercussions
The rising success of populist parties in elections across
the world suggests that hostile feelings toward political
decisionmakers are generally widespread among voters.
Populist parties characteristically draw on a rhetoric that
emphasizes the distance and estrangement between
ordinary citizens and the political establishment. Also,
prominent protest movements which have formed since
the global financial crisis of 2008 in various national
contexts hint at widespread discontent with the “polit‐
ical class,” as such movements typically confront estab‐
lished parties and politicians with ignored demands from
below. Next to such empirical reasons for proposing the
virulence of anti‐establishment attitudes, there are the‐
oretical accounts. Mudde’s (2004) diagnosis of a “pop‐
ulist zeitgeist” suggests that today populist discourse
has become a mainstream phenomenon in politics in
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advanced democracies. The outrage over established
political representatives represents a central part of such
a populist zeitgeist. Inglehart (1977) takes on another
perspective according to which postmodern societies
witnessed a “cognitive mobilization” throughout the
last decades, meaning that societal modernization trig‐
gered critical views toward political authorities (see also
Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Such a view is echoed in more
recent accounts which postulate the “deconsolidation”
(Foa & Mounk, 2017) or even the “end” (Levitsky &
Ziblatt, 2018) of democracy in face of decreasing lev‐
els of support for democratic institutions. Against this
backdrop, we expect that anti‐establishment attitudes
should be relatively widespread among the public (“anti‐
establishment zeitgeist” thesis).
Recent discussions on political discontent suggest
two popular individual‐level explanations for the preva‐
lence of anti‐establishment sentiment: socio‐economic
status and generational change. First, a growing body of
research confirms that parties and governments respond
unequally to different social status groups. For the
United States, Gilens (2012) documents selective respon‐
siveness on the part of political decisionmakers, in favor
of affluent citizens. He finds that political decisions only
reflect lower status citizens’ opinions if these coincide
with the preferences and opinions of affluent citizens.
Low and even middle‐income groups seem to have no
political influence once their preferences diverge from
those of top income groups. Studies on European coun‐
tries corroborate these findings (Elsässer et al., 2020;
Schakel, 2019). Explanations for this phenomenon vary
from interest‐group lobbying (Gilens, 2012) to political
participation (Gallego, 2014) or descriptive representa‐
tion (Bovens & Wille, 2017). As studies on perceived
responsiveness demonstrate, actual responsiveness is
indeedmirrored in perceived responsiveness. In a recent
comparative analysis, Lindh andMcCall (2020) show that
in nearly all countries under analysis workers perceive
the government as less responsive than members of the
middle and upper classes. As a consequence, it is sup‐
posed that perceived unresponsiveness gives birth to
anti‐establishment attitudes, as a rational and an emo‐
tional reaction. Second, there is support for the idea
that a generational change is afoot and is the influ‐
ence of shrinking support for democratic values and
decreasing institutional trust in Western democracies
(Dalton, 2004, 2005). As research shows, the young tend
to be less trusting of government and are less invested
in democracy than their elder counterparts (Citrin &
Stocker, 2018; Foa & Mounk, 2017). Whereas this is
interpreted as a form of emancipation and the emer‐
gence of more “critical” or more “assertive” citizens by
some authors (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; see Inglehart,
1977), others claim that generational change is bring‐
ing about democratic deconsolidation (Foa & Mounk,
2017). In face of existing accounts on unequal responsive‐
ness and assertive citizens, we expect that lower classes
(“unresponsiveness” thesis) and younger birth cohorts
(“critical citizens” thesis) should exhibit stronger anti‐
establishment attitudes.
In addition to individual‐level variation, perceptions
of political elites likely are conditioned by national con‐
texts and macrostructural processes. However, most of
the extant literature on political discontent has either
dealt with investigations at the individual or the aggre‐
gate level. As a consequence, multilevel designs remain
largely absent. Furthermore, while previous research
on the contextual determinants of democratic discon‐
tent has relied on cross‐sectional evidence and between
country effects, dynamics in contextual factors are often
overlooked. Although the literature on political dis‐
content has uncovered a broader set of macrostruc‐
tural explanations, we will focus on three popular
accounts: economic inequality, public corruption, and
economic affluence.
Economic affluence and socio‐economic conditions
are likely to shape popular perceptions of the functioning
of democratic institutions and their legitimacy in general
and therefore provide a fertile terrain for democratic con‐
solidation (Inglehart, 1977; “affluence” thesis). However,
it is also reasonable that it is not economic affluence as
such but rather the distribution of economic affluence
that matters for feelings and attitudes toward demo‐
cratic institutions and its personnel (Anderson & Singer,
2008; Schäfer, 2012). According to the Schattschneider’s
(1960) hypothesis, those with more economic resources
are able to eliminate policy alternatives from the polit‐
ical agenda beneficial to the lower and middle classes.
As a consequence, those in the lower and middle classes
will begin to believe that political decisionmakers are no
longer responsive to their political interests (“inequality”
thesis). In addition to economic affluence and its distribu‐
tion, anti‐establishment sentiment is likely to be rooted
in objective misconduct of politicians and whether polit‐
ical authorities play by the rules. A study by Anderson
and Tverdova (2003) indicates that trust in government
is negatively related to the actual level of corruption.
Consequently, we expect that anti‐establishment atti‐
tudes should be enhanced through actually observable
missing integrity of political decisionmakers (“objective
misconduct” thesis).
Have those who feel unrepresented by political deci‐
sionmakers become politically more or less active over
time? On the one hand, anti‐establishment attitudes
make up a sentiment that potentially inspires political
engagement. According to literature on populist vot‐
ing, discontented citizens experience political fulfillment
through voting for a party that voices their discon‐
tent, regardless of whether discontents are “expressed”
or (also) “fueled” (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Indeed, pop‐
ulist voting seems to be driven in large parts by politi‐
cal disaffection and perceived unresponsiveness (Ferrari,
2021; Rooduijn, 2018). Participation in unconventional
forms of political protest is also more likely for citizens
who have lost faith in politicians and public officials
(Gallego, 2014; Grasso et al., 2019; van Stekelenburg
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& Klandermans, 2013). While earlier research on polit‐
ical action has addressed protest activities such as
non‐voting or taking part in demonstrations,more recent
accounts additionally emphasize positing political opin‐
ions online on the web (Rensmann, 2017; Zukin et al.,
2006) and voting for outsider or challenger parties
(Inglehart & Norris, 2019). Citizens may choose “voice”
(as in voting for so‐called anti‐elite parties or join‐
ing protests) to express their discontent. This “voice”
option might be based on pure protest motives and on
perceptions of responsiveness because populist parties
and candidates often politicize issues which were previ‐
ously not debated. Unfavorable perceptions of political
elites are embedded in emotional states of anger (Rico
et al., 2017), resentment, and ressentiment (Capelos &
Demertzis, 2018; Salmela & Capelos, 2021; Salmela &
von Scheve, 2017). In particularly, anger and resentment
have previously been found to boost political action
(Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). Anti‐establishment atti‐
tudes are also of moralized character because political
elites are perceived as self‐serving and morally corrupt.
Since previous research reveals that morality increases
the motivation to become politically active (Skitka &
Bauman, 2008), a morality‐based rejection of political
decisionmakers might create a legitimized justification
for personal engagement. As Anduiza et al. (2019) show,
political attitudes which comprise an anti‐elitism compo‐
nent tend to have a positive effect on political engage‐
ment. On the other hand, anti‐establishment attitudes
might make citizens choose “exit” (as in abstention)
and thereby spur withdrawal from political life. As a
study by Capelos and Demertzis (2018) shows, politi‐
cal discontent as manifested in ressentiment can lead
to so‐called “dormant support” if it combines with per‐
ception of self‐efficacy. Thus, such a withdrawal may
either be performed as a form of “meaningful polit‐
ical agency” (Kemmers, 2017, p. 391) or simply as
a consequence of missing viable “voice” options, i.e.,
opportunity structures for articulating political discon‐
tent. However, throughout the last two decades viable
“voice” options have increased in contemporary democ‐
racies. Either in the form of the rise of populist chal‐
lenger parties (Inglehart & Norris, 2019), the spread of
protest movements (Grasso et al., 2019), or the increas‐
ing role of social media and digital publics (Rensmann,
2017). According to the literature, the success of pop‐
ulist anti‐elite parties and movements appears to be
fueled by the mobilization of politically alienated citi‐
zens who have a strong propensity to support populist
actors, because their populist discourse articulates citi‐
zens’ discontent with the political mainstream (Gidron &
Hall, 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Rooduijn et al.,
2016, 2017). Via options to visibly articulate discontent,
populist movements and parties are able to mobilize
excluded segments of society which have previously felt
unrepresented and left behind by the established politi‐
cal personnel. In face of populist parties’ electoral wins
since the Great Recession, the rise of new street protest
movements and the emergence of an angry political
web culture, we expect that increased “voice” opportuni‐
ties have strongly gathered support among citizens who
feel left behind and betrayed by political decisionmakers
(“increasing engagement” thesis).
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Data
We use data from the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP) for our analysis. In 2004 (field period:
2003–2006) and 2014 (field period: 2013–2016), the ISSP
contained a “citizenship” module, which asked respon‐
dents about their attitudes and feelings toward politi‐
cians (ISSP Research Group, 2012, 2016). For the analysis,
the number of countries decreases to 20 because some
countries did not participate in bothwaves and for others
important items are missing. The final dataset is there‐
fore a panel study on the country‐level, but with differ‐
ent individuals in each wave. It covers a set of developed
democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France,
Israel, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the
United States.
3.2. Variables and Analytical Design
In a first step, we explore anti‐establishment attitudes
and how differences therein can be explained.We opera‐
tionalize anti‐establishment attitudes on the basis of five
items which tap into citizens’ attitudes toward political
decisionmakers (see Table A1 in the Supplementary File
for exact wordings). The items indicate (1) towhat extent
respondents think that the government does not care
much about ordinary people, (2) to what extent respon‐
dents think that politicians cannot be trusted, (3) to
what extent respondents think that politicians are only
self‐serving, (4) to what extent respondents think that
government officials are committed to serve the peo‐
ple, and (5) whether respondents think corruption is
widespread among government officials. Following Rahn
(2019), we recode the items and construct a scale with a
0–1 rangewith higher values indicatingmore hostile feel‐
ings and attitudes toward political elites (cross‐country
Cronbach’s Alphas reach 0.71 and 0.74 respectively).
The investigation into anti‐establishment attitudes
relies on a multilevel hybrid model that nests peo‐
ple in years, which are in turn nested in countries.
This approach uses individual‐level data and allows the
decomposition of country‐level effects into a “between”
(cross‐sectional) and a “within” (longitudinal) compo‐
nents, while simultaneously controlling for compositional
effects from the individual level (Fairbrother, 2014).
In a second step, we analyze whether anti‐
establishment attitudes correlated with different forms
of political participation and how this has changed over
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time. We choose to distinguish between rather “conven‐
tional” forms of political action including (1) abstain‐
ing from voting and (2) voting for an anti‐elite party
next to so‐called “unconventional” political action in
form of (3) taking part in demonstrations and street
protests and (4) expressing political views on the inter‐
net (on such a distinction see, e.g., Barnes & Kaase,
1979; Capelos & Demertzis, 2018). Taking part in demon‐
strations, expressing political views on the internet and
abstain from voting are coded as dummy variables with a
value of 1 (otherwise 0) if respondents have participated
in a demonstration, or have posted something politi‐
cal on the internet in the past year, or did not vote in
the country’s last national election. By anti‐elite parties
we mean parties which Abedi (2004) defines as “anti‐
political‐establishment parties” and which (1) perceive
themselves as challengers to the parties that make up
the political establishment, (2) emphasize a fundamen‐
tal divide between the political establishment and the
people, and (3) challenge the status quo in terms of
major political issues. Against this backdrop, we oper‐
ationalize voting for an anti‐elite party by relying on
an indicator derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) which measures the salience of anti‐elite rhetoric
for political parties based on expert rankings (Bakker
et al., 2020). The salience score ranges from 0 (low) to
10 (high). Unfortunately, the measure is only available
for a set of European countries, this restricts our analysis
on voting decisions to a number of 12 European coun‐
tries. Therefore, we refrain from multilevel modelling in
the analysis of political participation and rely on simple
regression models with country and time fixed effects.
We operationalize objective social status via a
respondent’s location within the labor market with the
class schema based on Oesch (2013). Such a categoriza‐
tion leads to an eight‐class schema which distinguishes
between: (1) managers, (2) sociocultural professionals,
(3) technical specialists, (4) large employers, (5) small
business owners, (6) clerks, (7) production workers, and
(8) service workers. For the analysis, we slightly diverge
from the original schema and pooled managers and
large employers so that we use a seven‐class schema.
We measure generational differences by distinguishing
between 5 birth cohorts (1925–1940: inter war gen‐
eration, 1940–1955: 68ers, 1955–1970: babyboomers,
1970–1985: generation X, 1985–2000: generation Y).
As controls, we use subjective social status, mea‐
sured by a question asking respondents to place them‐
selves on a 10‐point social ladder reflecting their position
in society. For the highest schoolleaving certification, we
make use of the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED) and create four categories: (1) low
(no formal qualification/lower secondary education),
(2) medium (middle secondary education), (3) higher
medium (higher secondary education), and (4) high (ter‐
tiary education/university degree). Respondents’ inter‐
est in politics is measured on a 4‐point disapproval scale,
whereas respondents’ self‐perceived political under‐
standing is reported on a 4‐point approval scale. A vari‐
able covering the political self‐placement on a left‐right
scale has only been asked in the second wave of the
ISSP citizenship module (2013–2016) so that we have to
exclude this item from our analysis. The models also con‐
trol for family income and the number of persons living in
the household. Because the ISSP includes family income
in country specific values, each income value is stan‐
dardized relative to the country’s mean income. We also
control for gender (dummy variable: male/female) and
region (dummy variable: urban/rural).
In the multilevel analysis, we consider three explana‐
tory factors on the country level: economic inequality,
national economic affluence, and the level of public cor‐
ruption. Inequality is operationalized by the Gini index,
which measures the extent to which the distribution
of income among individuals or households deviates
from a perfectly equal distribution (SWIID, 2021). It can
range from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequal‐
ity). Affluence is measured by GDP per capita (PPP, in
$1,000 US; OECD, 2021). As ameasure for corruption, we
rely on the CPI (Corruption Perception Index)which ranks
countries based on how corrupt their public sector is
perceived by experts (Transparency International, 2021).
Note that the CPI ranges in value from 0 (highly corrupt)
to 10 (absolutely clean from corruption). The selected
indicators always refer to the year before the ISSP field‐
work year.
4. Findings
How widespread are negative attitudes toward political
decisionmakers in contemporary democracies? Visual
inspection of the distribution of the scale of anti‐
establishment attitudes shows it to be normally dis‐
tributed. In both survey waves, around 16% of the
respondents express strong anti‐establishment attitudes,
as indicated by values in the highest quartile on the scale
(Figure 1). However, nearly 80% of all respondents are
grouped in both quartiles in the middle of the scale.
This indicates that contemporary democracies are nei‐
ther polarized by negative feelings toward politicians,
nor can we speak of widespread anti‐establishment sen‐
timent which manifests itself in an “anti‐establishment
zeitgeist.” The results are not indicative of a so‐called
“silent majority,” which is marked by strong feelings
of political discontent. Our findings align with empiri‐
cal research (van Ham et al., 2017) that does not offer
backup for the diagnosis of “democratic deconsolida‐
tion” in advanced democracies, since the great majority
still supports democratic norms and institutions.
As the literature on democratic support indicates,
there are cross‐country differences in legitimacy beliefs,
trust levels and sentiments (Martini & Quaranta, 2020).
This is confirmed by our findings on anti‐establishment
sentiment. Figure 2 shows the prevalence and tem‐
poral development of anti‐establishment sentiment
among the 20 democracies, as measured using our














Figure 1. Distribution of anti‐establishment attitudes. Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016, weighted).
anti‐establishment attitudes scale. Whereas average
anti‐establishment attitudes remained relatively sta‐
ble in some cases (Finland, Australia, Austria, Czech
Republic) or strongly decreased in some (Norway,
Germany, Sweden), it strongly increased in others
(United States, Spain, Slovenia). However, the over‐
all means for both survey waves are nearly identical
(0.556 for wave 1 and 0.552 for wave 2). Although
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Figure 2. Mean values of anti‐establishment attitudes, by wave and country. Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016,
weighted).
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there are some fluctuations at the country‐level, anti‐
establishment attitudes have neither increased uni‐
formly among publics nor have they exploded since the
beginning of the century and throughout the years of the
Great Recession.
How is anti‐establishment sentiment distributed
among different social groups, andwhich contextual con‐
ditions favor beliefs that the political personnel is alien‐
ated from their voters? The coefficient plots in Figure 3
and 4 show results from hierarchical linear multilevel
regressions which nest individuals (N = 33,246; level 1) in
40 country‐years (level 2), which are nested in 20 coun‐
tries (level 3; for detailed information see Table A2 in
the Supplementary File). The intraclass coefficient in
the empty model (Model 0) indicates that most of the
variance in anti‐establishment sentiment is located at
the individual level. However, there is also a consider‐
able amount of variance between countries (19.9%) and
between survey waves (23.5%).
At the individual level, results reveal that social
class and birth cohort membership matter for anti‐
establishment attitudes. We can find a clear class‐
gradient which confirms the class‐based “unresponsive‐
ness” thesis. Anti‐establishment attitudes are stronger
among production workers in contrast to managers.
There are also significant differences between service
workers, clerks and technical professionals in contrast
to the manager class, albeit to a lower degree. No sig‐
nificant differences in anti‐establishment attitudes exist
betweenmanagers and sociocultural professionals. Thus,
by large and as expected from the literature, the dif‐
ferences between social classes in anti‐establishment
attitudes support the idea that actual unequal gov‐
ernment responsiveness goes hand in hand with per‐
ceived unresponsiveness. However, such an explanation
is not necessarily true. A lower status position could
also give rise to complex feelings of ressentiment and
denied social recognition which can find expression
in scapegoating or assigning responsibility to external
“enemies.” With political decisionmakers representing
only one of those “enemies” among others (see Ferrari,
2021; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). Besides, the strong
anti‐establishment sentiment among self‐employed as
compared to managers remains in need of an expla‐
nation. This result could be interpreted as a sign of
the alienation of specific parts of the middle classes
from the political process, albeit we should be care‐
ful with this, because the group of the self‐employed
is very heterogenous. As expected above, the analysis
documents statistically significant differences between
birth cohorts. In contrast to the youngest birth cohort,
older birth cohorts are more positive about the polit‐
ical personnel. There is, however, no statistically sig‐
nificant difference between the youngest birth cohort
(1985–2000) and the cohort born between 1970 and
1985. When it comes to attitudes toward political elites,
there seems to exist a generational gap which sepa‐
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Figure 3. Coefficient plot for the individual level. Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are based on
Model M2 in Table A2 in the Supplementary File. Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016).
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Figure 4. Coefficient plot for the contextual level. Note: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are based on
Model M2 in Table A2 in the Supplementary File. Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016).
Such findings support accounts which emphasize the rise
of elite‐challenging sentiments among younger genera‐
tions and are congruent with the cohort‐based “critical
citizens” thesis (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Foa & Mounk,
2017). Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this is
driven by value change, intergenerational social down‐
ward mobility or resentment, which is rooted in the par‐
ticipation within digital publics among younger genera‐
tions. The control variables show that respondents feel
unrepresented by political decisionmakers to a larger
extent, when they place themselves in the lower ranks
of the social ladder, earn less, have lower levels of edu‐
cation, live in rural regions, are politically disinterested,
and perceive themselves as competent and knowledge‐
able in political issues.
At the contextual level, we find a positive and statis‐
tically significant relationship between income inequal‐
ity and citizens’ attitudes toward politicians. However,
this relationship is driven by within‐country differences,
i.e., differences between survey years, whereas levels
in societal income inequality between countries do not
explain differences in citizens’ anti‐establishment senti‐
ment. Thus, people exhibitmore hostile attitudes toward
politicians in those years where more inequality exists
in their country than what exists during an average
year (within‐country effect). We also discover a nega‐
tive and statistically significant association between eco‐
nomic affluence and citizens’ perception of politicians.
This relationship is also driven by within‐country differ‐
ences. Thus, it is more the dynamics of affluence which
matter for discontent with the political establishment
than its actual level. Not surprisingly then, on average,
economic downturns are associated with hostile feelings
toward political decisionmakers. Results further suggest
that, all else equal, citizens living in a country where cor‐
ruption in the public sector is widespread, have a more
negative opinion of politicians compared to those liv‐
ing in a less corrupt society. In contrast, within country
dynamics in public corruption do not matter. In other
words, knowing the level of corruption in a country,
relative to other countries, gives us purchase on their
beliefs about the responsiveness and moral integrity
of their political authorities. Knowing how corruption
prevalence in a given society has changed between sur‐
vey waves, however, does not help to explain citizens’
anti‐establishment sentiment. Thus, whereas contextual
dynamics are important when it comes to inequality and
affluence, levels are decisive when it comes to official
misconduct by political decisionmakers. Yet, note that
we have to interpret the contextual effects with caution,
since the number of countries (N = 20) in the analysis is
rather small.
Are anti‐establishment attitudes related to active
political participation, or rather to a withdrawal from
political life? Due to limited space and because we
are mainly interested in the association between anti‐
establishment attitudes and different forms of politi‐
cal participation, we leave other variables undiscussed.
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Table 1 shows that, net of controls, respondents who
score higher on the anti‐establishment attitudes scale
are more likely (1) to abstain from voting in national elec‐
tions, (2) to take part in street protests, and (3) to post
and discuss political issues on the internet. Besides, and
not very surprising, (4) respondents with stronger nega‐
tive feelings toward politicians also vote for partieswhich
criticize the political elite and emphasize the aloofness
of the political personnel more strongly. Therefore, anti‐
establishment attitudes correlate with both: active polit‐
ical participation and withdrawal from political life. This
finding suggests that although some citizens share the
same kind of attitudes toward political decisionmakers,
the articulations of such attitudes are far from homoge‐
nous. Indeed, as qualitative evidence suggests, the cho‐
sen form of political action depends on citizens’ power
orientation which consists of the (implicit) definitions
of the situation with regard to where political power is
located and who the main actors who possess power
are (Kemmers, 2017). Accordingly, we should be care‐
ful about speaking of “the discontented citizens,” since
their discontent finds different political expressions and
seems to be embedded in different understandings of
the concept of democracy and contradictory expecta‐
tions toward political representation (Celis et al., 2021;
Sullivan, 2021).
But have the associations between anti‐
establishment attitudes and political action perhaps
changed over time? Figure 5 displays the predicted prob‐
abilities (the average of the predicted probability for
all respondents in the analysis) of political participation
for different levels of anti‐establishment sentiment over
time (see Table A3 in the Supplementary File for detailed
information). Looking at all types of political activity, we
see again that anti‐establishment attitudes are a good
predictor in all cases of political action. However, the
predicted probabilities indicate that anti‐establishment
attitudes are a much more important predictor of voting
abstention and taking part in demonstrations or street
protest around 2004 compared to the years around 2014.
It should be noted that the difference for voting absten‐
tion is no longer statistically significant for respondents
who score very high on the anti‐establishment attitudes
scale. In contrast, we can observe a different pattern
for online posts and voting for anti‐elite parties. Around
2014, anti‐establishment attitudes substantially affected
Table 1. Regression estimates of the effect of anti‐establishment attitudes on types of political participation.
M1 M2 M3 M4
abstain from voting taking part in posting political voting for
in national demonstrations opinions on the anti‐elite
elections and street protests internet parties
AME p AME p AME p Coef. p
Anti‐establishment sentiment .137 *** .030 ** .055 *** 1.975 ***
Male (Reference: female) .023 *** −.000 .009 ** .131 ***
Birth cohort (reference: 1985–2000)
Birth cohort: 1925–1940 −.187 *** −.078 *** −.127 *** −.284 ***
Birth cohort: 1940–1955 −.182 *** −.052 *** −.105 *** −.218 **
Birth cohort: 1955–1970 −.134 *** −.034 *** −.078 *** −.074
Birth cohort: 1970–1985 −.074 *** −.034 *** −.045 *** .029
Urban .015 ** .021 *** .009 ** −.060
Occupation (Reference: managers)
Self‐employed .004 −.001 .007 .068
Sociocultural professionals −.002 .029 *** 007 .139 *
Technical professionals −.001 .002 .005 .137 *
Clerks .007 −.007 −.001 .123 *
Service workers .034 *** .006 −.001 .323 ***
Production workers .032 *** .002 −.008 .273 ***
Household income −.016 *** −.002 −.002 −.102 ***
Education level (ISCED) −.013 *** .007 *** .012 *** −.034
Subjective social status −.008 *** −.002 * −.001 −.038 ***
Political disinterest .057 *** −.031 *** −.043 *** −.116 ***
Perceived political knowledge −.012 *** .005 *** .010 *** .033
wave 2 (Reference: wave 1) −.044*** −.026*** .038*** .386***
Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Adj. pseudo R2 .190 .156 .169 .196
N 31,034 32,789 32,515 16,735
Notes: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016).
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities for anti‐establishment attitudes on different types of political participation over time.
Source: ISSP Research Group (2012, 2016).
the likelihood of politically motivated online activity,
especially for high levels of anti‐establishment attitudes,
while this does not hold true for 2004. When it comes
to voting for anti‐elite parties, the plot in the bottom
right corner of Figure 5 demonstrates the strength of
the substantive effect of anti‐establishment attitudes.
The predicted effect sizes indicate that respondents who
strongly feel left behind and unheard by political deci‐
sionmakers have increasingly turned toward anti‐elite
parties in national elections over time. Respondentswith
strong hostile feelings toward political officials vote for
parties which on average score up to 2 points higher on
the CHES‐anti‐elite salience scale in 2014 as compared
to the years around 2004. All in all, thus, our “increasing
engagement” thesis is only partly confirmed, since it is
limited to posting political opinion online and supporting
anti‐elite parties. What is the main take‐away of our ana‐
lysis? The results of the interaction plots (Figure 5) point
out that something has happened. The different effect
sizes for the different waves could be interpreted as a
consequence of changed opportunity structures, both
at the party level (emergence of populist anti‐elite par‐
ties) and the level of the political publics (social media
platforms and political web culture). First, the findings
demonstrate the return of politically disaffected voters
to the ballot box. Over the last two decades, their feel‐
ing of being left behind by political decisionmakers has
increasingly translated into support for anti‐elite parties
who draw on a rhetoric that emphasizes the distance
between ordinary citizens and the political personnel.
Second, whereas citizens who feel alienated from the
political establishment still participate more often in
demonstrations and street protests than others. They
seem to have increasingly left the streets in favor of
online “voice” options on the web.
5. Conclusion
According to much of the present literature, feelings and
beliefs among many citizens of being left behind and
unheard by unresponsive political decisionmakers, who
lack moral integrity represent the epicenter of recent
protests and discontent in democratic society. In this
article, our first aim was to take a look at the preva‐
lence of anti‐establishment sentiment, i.e., negative atti‐
tudes toward political officials, and to identify which
social groups are more discontented with the political
elite than others as well as which social macro‐contexts
are associated with such sentiment. In a second step,
we have focused on the consequence of discontent
with politicians for political participation and explored
whether citizens with more negative attitudes toward
political decisionmakers have rather become politically
active over time or politically apathetic.
Based on two ISSP waves for 20 contemporary
democracies, we found that anti‐establishment attitudes
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are not as widespread among citizens as accounts on a
“populist zeitgeist” or a “silent majority” would suggest.
Such attitudes are associated with certain macrostruc‐
tural dynamics, since anti‐establishment attitudes are
more widespread among publics in countries which
exhibit higher levels of public corruption and witnessed
increasing levels of economic inequality. At the indi‐
vidual level, such attitudes are restricted to particu‐
lar segments of society, since hostile feelings toward
political decisionmakers are stronger among citizens
in the lower ranks of society and among younger
birth cohorts. Although anti‐establishment sentiment
has not increased among the public since the begin‐
ning of the century and throughout the Great Recession,
our analysis indicates that citizens with such attitudes
have increasingly turned toward voting anti‐elite par‐
ties to raise their voice and now make use of online
“voice” options to express their political views more
frequently than in the past. We have interpreted this
finding as a result of changing opportunity structures
and macrostructural contexts. Thus, when anti‐elitist
discourse succeeds in resonating with relatively stable
attitudes toward political decisionmakers in the popula‐
tion, these attitudes can find expression in viable modes
of political action whether in the form of support for
political candidates or participation in movement‐based
protests and digital publics.
Our study is confronted by several limitations. First,
our operationalization of anti‐establishment sentiment
which basically relies on extracting people’s (latent) eval‐
uative attitudes from self‐reported answers cannot fully
satisfy “anti‐establishmentness” in its emotional com‐
plexity. Indeed, our operationalization leaves the affec‐
tive part of anti‐establishment sentiment largely unad‐
dressed, since affective evaluations on the basis of
emotions like anger, outrage, resentment, worry, frus‐
tration, powerlessness, or even hate are not included in
our measure (see Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Salmela &
Capelos, 2021; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). However,
since data for such more complex measurements does
not exist for cross‐country comparative research, we
have to rely on available datasets. Second, our study
investigates anti‐establishment attitudes with reference
to a specific group of elites, namely established politi‐
cians. Therefore, our findings cannot be generalized to
other groups of elites (e.g., media elites, intellectual
elites, economic elites). Third, due to the use of a cross‐
sectional design, we are restricted to describing correla‐
tions and cannot really conclude on causal effects of anti‐
establishment attitudes.
As Dalton (2004, p. 7) states, “dissatisfaction with
authorities, within a democratic system, is not usually a
signal for basic political change.” In his landmark work,
The Silent Revolution, Inglehart (1977) theorizes and
demonstrates the motivation driving the rise of elite‐
challenging action and distrust—a growing emancipa‐
tory spirit visible in changing value orientations. Similarly,
Dalton and Welzel (2014) conclude that citizens have
turned toward a decidedly “assertive” posture to politics:
They have become more distrustful of traditional poli‐
tics and are increasingly ready to confront representa‐
tives with demands from below. Today observations of a
“backlash” against liberal democracy (Inglehart & Norris,
2019) or “reactionary politics” (Capelos & Katsanidou,
2018) expose such earlier diagnoses as rather optimistic
and hint at the socially disintegrative and regressive char‐
acter of elite‐challenging sentiment. Not only is such sen‐
timent distributed unequally across social groups, it has
increasingly found expression in vote choice and political
online activity. Indeed, it seems that political apathy has
given way to resentful activity, at least in parts.
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